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Abstract 
This paper investigates competition in electricity markets when each pair of 
strategic firms exchanges forward obligations pairwise-efficiently. The gains from 
pairwise trade are specific to the counterparty, which can be horizontally- or 
vertically-related depending on whether it has access to flexibility in the spot 
market. The analysis shows that pairwise efficient forward trade rules out a bilateral 
oligopoly spot market where net buyers and net sellers strategically interact. Firms 
without flexibility close their position entirely in the forward market. Forward 
markets serve to absorb renewable energy shocks, even if forward contracts are 
unobservable and firms are risk-neutral. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Forward obligations are known to crucially determine the exercise of market power 
in wholesale electricity spot markets. Consequently, the question how firms sign 
forward contracts in equilibrium is a classic one, and is one that continues to be 
highly relevant. What are the interactions between the forward market and the real-
time market? And how can we expect the forward market to absorb supply shocks 
caused by renewables; which firms take up which positions? 
This paper addresses these questions by using the concept pairwise efficiency. This 
concept requires that, in any equilibrium, each pair of strategic firms should not be 
able to gain from additionally exchanging forward obligations bilaterally, 
considering how doing so would affect competition in the spot market and taking 
as given the other forward obligations in the market.2 This equilibrium condition 
has the important advantage that it is relevant whenever there is an over-the-counter 
market where firms can trade secretly, which is the case for most real-world 
electricity markets.3 
This approach advances on previous work studying forward trade in two important 
ways. First, the literature following Allaz and Vila (1993) is based on the idea that 
forward obligations can act as a commitment device.4 The commitment value, 
however, is known to break down when firms can also sign contracts secretly, for 
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example in an over-the-counter market.5 This paper contributes to that literature by 
revealing strategic motivations for forward trading that do not rely on the heroic 
assumption that all contracts are perfectly observable to third parties. Second, it is 
well-understood—and documented—that both sellers and buyers can behave 
strategically in electricity markets.6 For instance, it is not uncommon for producers 
to, after receiving unfavorable renewable generation forecasts, act as a buyer in the 
forward market or the spot market. Also, retailers or aggregators can behave 
strategically, for example by adjusting their offtakes using smart-metering 
technologies. This paper is first to analyze trade between strategic buyers and 
sellers, both in the spot market and in the forward market.7 
By studying pairwise trade, this paper analyzes how a firm’s incentive to sign a 
forward contract depends on the characteristics of the counterparty. A crucial 
characteristic of the counterparty is whether it has the flexibility to strategically 
alter its physical impact on the electricity system, either by adjusting its production 
or by adjusting its consumption. Firms with access to such flexibility in the spot 
market are denoted as dispatchable firms, and firms without such flexibility are 
labelled as non-dispatchable firms. Consequently, the concept pairwise efficiency 
captures two types of relations. When the pair consists of two dispatchable firms, 
the relation in the forward market is horizontal. Alternatively, trade between a 
dispatchable and a non-dispatchable firm constitutes a vertical relation. 
Horizontal relations—The analysis of horizontal relations generates the following 
finding: strategic dispatchable firms are either all net buyers or all net sellers in the 
spot market. The intuition is as follows. If the finding would not hold, the market 
would be a so-called bilateral oligopoly, where net buyers exercise market power 
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by underconsuming and net sellers exercise market power by underproducing as 
compared to the social optimum (see Hendricks and McAfee (2010) on a theory of 
bilateral oligopoly). Firms would thus suffer from a deadweight loss: in equilibrium 
the net buyers’ willingness to pay exceeds the net sellers’ marginal cost. 
Now consider a pairwise contract between a net buyer and a net seller. The net 
buyer, by purchasing an additional unit from the net seller in the forward market, 
reduces its volume exposed to the spot market price. Consequently, it has fewer 
incentives exercise buyer power. Similarly, the net seller, by selling an additional 
unit in the forward market, also reduces its volume exposed to the spot market price 
and has fewer incentives to exercise seller power. 
Such a pairwise contract is always profitable for two reasons. First, cost-efficiency 
improves by bringing firms’ markups—and hence firms’ marginal costs—closer to 
each other. Second, bilateral oligopoly markets have the unique feature that firms, 
when exercising market power, impose negative externalities on the firms that have 
net positions of the oppose sign. In particular, a net buyer is hurt by a net seller’s 
exercise of seller power and a net seller is hurt by a net buyer’s exercise of buyer 
power. By taking positions of the same sign, firms rule out these negative 
competitive externalities. Pairwise trade in the forward market can thus be 
profitable as well as pro-competitive by avoiding the inefficiencies associated with 
bilateral oligopoly. 
The analysis thus predicts that renewable energy shocks are processed through the 
forward market in a way such that all firms have a net position of the same sign. 
This indicates a role for forward trade to absorb firm-specific shocks and spread 
them across multiple firms. This prediction, which relies on imperfect competition, 
would also follow from a model of perfect competition where forward trade is 
motivated by risk-aversion. In those models, too, there would be incentives for 
firms to spread risks by aligning their net positions.8 The strategic incentives for 
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forward trading reported in this paper can thus complement incentives for forward 
trading that relate to risk hedging. 
The analysis also has implications for the design of short-term electricity markets 
with renewables. The model fits this application as follows: firms can trade forward 
in the intraday timeframe and the spot market is the real-time market. Firms’ 
renewable energy generation forecasts typically become precise only the last hours 
before real-time.9 This may hinder firms to trade pairwise-efficiently, an issue 
illustrated in figure 1. The upper part of the diagram displays the scenario where 
intraday trading is no longer possible after firms learn about idiosyncratic shocks 
to their renewable energy portfolios. If so, firms who suffer from adverse shocks to 
their portfolios are no longer able to trade with others who enjoy positive shocks. 
In other words, unexpected shocks to firms’ renewable energy portfolios can cause 
firms’ forward contracts to violate pairwise efficiency. Consequently, the real-time 
market risks being a bilateral oligopoly. Extending the intraday trading timeframe 
closer to real-time remedies this issue by facilitating firms to trade with more 
accurate information, as depicted in the lower diagram. Firms’ positions at the end 
of the intraday trading timeframe are then less likely to violate pairwise efficiency. 
In this way, a late intraday gate closure time reduces the inefficiencies associated 
with bilateral oligopoly.10 
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Figure 1: early vs. late intraday gate closure time. 
Vertical relations—The analysis of vertical relations finds that non-dispatchable 
firms do not incur a shortage nor a surplus in the spot market. Pairwise efficient 
trade essentially mutes their role in the spot market: the pair optimally makes the 
dispatchable firm the residual claimant on all variable profits. 
This result contributes to the debate on whether short-term electricity markets 
should allow virtual bidders—market participants without physical assets (see e.g. 
Birge et al. (2018) and Jha and Wolak (2019)). The usual concern by policymakers 
is that these market participants would reduce system reliability and predictability. 
This paper shows that under pairwise efficiency, firms without dispatchable 
physical assets, despite acting strategically, do not contribute to the system 
imbalance. 
The result also predicts how renewable energy generators who lack flexibility in 
the real-time market deal with shocks to their portfolio. If they are sophisticated 
enough to trade pairwise-efficiently in the forward market, they trade to not incur 
imbalances in real-time. This insight can also be phrased normatively: firms 
without access to flexibility should attempt to close their position at the end of the 
intraday market timeframe. 
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Finally, this paper combines the analysis of horizontal and the analysis of vertical 
relations. The former analysis shows that strategic dispatchable firms do not 
transact with each other in the spot market. The latter analysis shows that strategic 
non-dispatchable firms incur a net position equal to zero in the spot market. 
Combining both results, at least one “side” of the spot market—the net buyers or 
the net sellers—have either foregone profitable forward trading opportunities, or 
have behaved sub-optimally in the spot market. There can be several explanations 
for such an outcome. First, there may be frictions such as uncertainty or asymmetric 
information that hinder firms to trade pairwise efficiently. Second, firms may fail 
to trade pairwise efficiently or to profit-maximize due to limited strategic ability. 
The latter explanation is in line with findings by Hortacsu and Puller (2008) and 
Hortacsu et al. (2019), who study heterogeneity in firms’ strategic ability in the 
Texas real-time electricity market. 
The remainder of this paper is phrased to fit its application to short-term electricity 
markets. The plan is as follows. Section 2 models the real-time market and 
demonstrates the bilateral oligopoly problem. Section 3 analyzes pairwise efficient 
forward trade and proves the main results. Section 4 provides discussion. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The real-time market 
 
This section models the real-time market for exogenous forward contract positions. 
We start by modelling the components of firms’ real-time market trade volumes 
and proceed by modelling and analyzing the strategic interaction in the real-time 
market. 
The components of firms’ real-time market trade volumes 
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A firm’s trade volume in the real time market is determined by (1) its forward 
contract position, (2) its non-dispatchable physical assets, and (3) its dispatchable 
physical assets. 
1. Forward contract position 
First, firms can have forward contracts in their portfolio.11 Firm i’s net forward 
purchases are denoted by iq  and its net financial transfer received in the forward 
market is denoted by it . We allow variable iq  to be negative, in which case the firm 
is a net seller in the forward market. Since any commitment taken up by one firm 
is an asset held by another firm, the sum of all forward contract positions equals 
zero, or 0iq = . 
2. Non-dispatchable physical assets. 
Second, firms can have physical assets in their portfolio that are non-dispatchable. 
For example, some power facilities are prohibitively expensive to shut down (e.g. 
nuclear power plants), making them non-dispatchable in the short-run. As another 
example, technologies such as wind power and solar power, if they enjoy dispatch 
priority, are also non-dispatchable. Also, a consumption portfolio can consist of 
households who consume inflexibly due to the absence of smart-metering. 
We denote firm i ’s net surplus from its non-dispatchable portfolio by iq . This 
surplus is defined as the difference between firm i 's injections originating from its 
non-dispatchable production assets and firm i 's offtakes originating from its non-
dispatchable consumption assets. We allow iq  to be negative, in which case it 
should be interpreted as a net shortage. 
3. Dispatchable physical assets 
Finally, firms can have generation or consumption assets in their portfolio that are 
dispatchable. For example, gas-fired power plants can be called upon to produce, 
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 Whether contracts are physical or financial does not alter the analysis. 
9 
 
depending on market conditions. As another example, flexibility could come from 
demand-side response, enabling firms to reduce consumption when needed. 
Firm i ’s net surplus from its dispatchable portfolio is denoted by iq . We allow iq  
to be negative, in which case it should be interpreted as a net shortage. 
Firm i ’s cost to attain a net surplus of iq  with its dispatchable portfolio is denoted 
by ( )i iC q , assumed twice continuously differentiable, and characterized by strictly 
increasing marginal costs ( ( )'' 0i iC q  ). 
The increasing marginal cost curve captures that firms dispatch their dispatchable 
assets following their merit-order. For example, each firm activates its cheapest 
generation units first before using more expensive technologies. Likewise, each 
firm first decreases consumption from its consumption assets characterized by the 
lowest willingness to pay for electricity, before switching off consumption assets 
characterized by a higher willingness to pay. Importantly, the marginal cost curve 
represents dispatchable production units as well as dispatchable consumption units: 
flexibility can originate both from the supply side and the demand side. 
We distinguish two types of firms: dispatchable firms and non-dispatchable firms. 
Dispatchable firms: firms who have dispatchable production or consumption 
assets in their portfolio. 
Non-dispatchable firms: firms who do not have dispatchable production or 
consumption assets. 
When firm i  is non-dispatchable, we write that 0iq =  and ( )0 0iC = . 
We can summarize that firm i ’s net surplus in the real-time market is determined 
by its financial and physical assets and equals 
 i i i iQ q q q + + . 
Figure 2 visualizes an example marginal cost curve of a dispatchable firm. 
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Figure 2: an example marginal cost curve of a dispatchable firm. 
Several observations are useful to point out. First, the firm is a net buyer in the real-
time market when 0i i i iQ q q q   − − , and is a net seller in the real-time market 
when 0i i i iQ q q q   − − . Second, the marginal cost at which the firm produces 
i i iq q q= − − , the amount needed to be balanced, equals ( )i i iC q q− − . This marginal 
cost is larger when the firm has a lower net surplus from its non-dispatchable 
portfolio ( iq ). Third, the firm’s marginal cost can originate from a production unit 
or a consumption unit, both when the firm is a net buyer and when the firm is a net 
seller in the real-time market. 
Strategic interaction in the real-time market 
The real-time market balances electricity injections and offtakes such that the 
following equation holds. 
Balanced electricity system equation: a balanced electricity system requires that 
the physical surplus aggregated over all firms equals zero, or 
 ( ) 0i iq q+ = . 
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There is a uniform price, denoted by P , that firms receive for their net surplus or 
pay for their net shortage. We will distinguish non-strategic firms from strategic 
firms. The non-strategic firms act as a fringe and are represented as being one firm, 
indexed i f= . The N  strategic firms are indexed by 1,...,i N=  and interact as 
Cournot competitors.12 
1. Non-strategic fringe 
The non-strategic fringe is defined as follows. 
Non-strategic fringe: firms who, in the real-time market, bid energy from their 
physical assets independently from firms’ forward contract positions. 
This definition includes the following two specific forms of non-strategic behavior. 
First, it includes the possibility that non-strategic firms behave competitively and 
bid marginal cost. So, the non-strategic firms could be interpreted as a competitive 
price-taking fringe. Second, the set of non-strategic firms can also include firms 
who produce and consume fixed amounts with their physical assets, regardless of 
market conditions. 
We model the net surplus of the fringe’s physical assets, f fq q+ , as a linearly 
increasing function of the uniform price P  as follows: 
 f f
a P
q q
b b
+ = − + , 
where a  and 0b   are constants. We can rewrite the balanced electricity system 
equation to plug in ( )f f i i
i N
q q q q

+ = − + . We obtain 
 ( )i i
i N
P a b q q

= −  + . 
This shows that the schedule offered by the non-strategic fringe determines the 
inverse demand function faced by the strategic firms.  
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2. Strategic firms 
We are now ready to characterize the behavior of the strategic firms in the real-time 
market. Strategic firms are defined as follows. 
Strategic firms: firms who are profit-maximizers in the real-time market. 
We subsequently analyze strategic non-dispatchable firms and strategic 
dispatchable firms. 
a. Strategic non-dispatchable firms 
Strategic non-dispatchable firms do not have dispatchable physical assets available 
for strategic use. When firm i  is non-dispatchable, its net surplus in the real-time 
market equals i iq q+ . 
b. Strategic dispatchable firms 
The strategic dispatchable firms compete à la Cournot in the real-time market. Each 
strategic dispatchable firm simultaneously decides about the net surplus of its 
dispatchable portfolio. When firm i  is dispatchable, its variable profits can be 
written as 
 ( ) ( )
i
i i i i i i i
Q
t P q q q C q = +  + + − . 
Since the inverse demand curve is linear and the marginal cost curve is strictly 
increasing, the first-order conditions for maximization with respect to iq  are 
necessary and sufficient. They equal 
 ( ) ( )* ' *i i i i iP b q q q C q−  + + = . 
This shows that dispatchable firms with a positive net surplus produce at a marginal 
cost below the market-clearing price. In contrast, dispatchable firms with a negative 
net surplus produce at a marginal cost above the market-clearing price. 
Real-time market is a bilateral oligopoly: at least one strategic dispatchable firm 
is a net buyer and at least one strategic dispatchable firm is a net seller. 
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An important feature in electricity markets is that firms’ injections and offtakes 
originating from non-dispatchable physical assets are subject to shocks. For 
example, household demand for electric heating and cooling is subject to 
temperatures. Also, wind power generation requires the wind to blow, and 
generation from solar panels depends on the amount of sunshine. Result 1 states 
that this establishes the potential for bilateral oligopoly. 
Result 1: If firms cannot reconsider their forward contract positions after learning 
about renewable energy shocks, the real-time market can be a bilateral oligopoly. 
The appendix offers a proof by example. If forward markets close early, firms can 
no longer reconsider their forward contract position after learning about late 
idiosyncratic shocks to their portfolios caused by renewables. As a result, the real-
time market can be composed of strategic dispatchable firms who are net buyers 
due negative shocks (unexpectedly low iq ) and other strategic dispatchable firms 
who are net sellers because of positive shocks (unexpectedly high iq ). 
 
3. Pairwise efficient forward trade 
  
This section investigates pairwise efficient forward trade among strategic firms. 
Pairwise efficiency requires firms’ forward contract positions to be such that each 
pair of strategic firms cannot gain by engaging in additional bilateral trade, taking 
as given the forward contract positions of other firms in the industry, and 
considering unilaterally optimal behavior in the real-time market. The bilateral 
contract is unobservable to firms that do not take part in the contract. This 
corresponds to the notion of private or secret contracting familiar from the vertical 
relations literature. 
We distinguish the following types of pairs: 
• Horizontally-related pair: consists of two strategic dispatchable firms. 
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• Vertically-related pair: consists of a strategic dispatchable and a strategic 
non-dispatchable firm. 
• For completeness, we also investigate pairs consisting of two strategic non-
dispatchable firms. 
The following notation, depicted in table 1, distinguishes the different types of 
pairs. Firm 1 and firm 2 are representative examples of strategic dispatchable firms. 
Firm 3 and firm 4 are representative examples of strategic non-dispatchable firms. 
Firm 1 and firm 2 then form a representative horizontally-related pair. Firm 1 and 
firm 3 form a representative vertically-related pair. Finally, firm 3 and firm 4 form 
a representative pair of non-dispatchable firms. 
  
firm 1 
dispatchable 
firm 4 
non-dispatchable 
 
firm 2 
dispatchable 
horizontally-related 
pair  
 
firm 3 
non-dispatchable vertically-related pair 
pair of strategic 
non-dispatchable firms 
 
Table 1: representative pairs of firms 
We proceed by analyzing (1) a horizontally-related pair, (2) a vertically-related 
pair, and (3) a pair of strategic non-dispatchable firms. 
1. Horizontally-related pair 
We consider pairwise trade between firm 1 and firm 2.13 We denote firms’ 
candidate net forward contract positions by an asterisk (*): *1q  for firm 1 and *2q  
for firm 2. Next, we investigate whether firms have incentives to sign an additional 
forward contract that commits firm 1 to purchase   additional units from firm 2. 
Consequently, *1 1q q = +  and *2 2q q = − . The choice about which firm acts as 
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 The techniques used in this subsection partly draw from Spiegel (1993)’s analysis. My model 
differs by studying more than two firms and, crucially, by studying the possibility of bilateral 
oligopoly. 
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seller and which firm acts as buyer is without loss of generality because   can be 
positive or negative. 
Two remarks are useful. First, the size of the financial transfer between the two 
firms is zero-sum from a bilateral point of view. Since the transfer paid by one firm 
is received by the other firm, the sum 1 2t t+  is unaffected. Moreover, the financial 
transfer occurs in the forward market and is regarded as sunk when firms compete 
in the real-time market. Consequently, the transfer does not determine equilibrium 
behavior; it is not part of the first-order conditions that characterize *1q  or 
*
2q . 
Second, since contracts are private, the behavior of outsiders to the contract is 
independent of  . We can thus write that ( )* *  for 1, 2j jq q j =  . 
Firms’ variable profits are 
(1) ( )( )*1 1 1 1 1t PQ C q = + −  
(2) ( )( )*2 2 2 2 2t PQ C q = + − , 
where 
 ( ) ( ) ( )* * *1 1 2 2
1,2
j j
j N
j
P a b q q q q q q 


  = − + + + + +   
   
 ( )* *1 1 1 1Q q q q = + + +   
 ( )* *2 2 2 2Q q q q = − + + . 
The pair of firms maximizes profits with respect to  . Bilateral profits equal (1) + 
(2). Maximizing with respect to  , we obtain the necessary first-order condition 
 
( ) ( )( )1 2 0d
d
   

+ = , 
which can be written as  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *1 2 1 21 2 1 1 2 2
* * * *
1 2 1 2
0 00
0
dq dq dq dq
q d q d q d q d
        
     
= ==
     + + + + + =      . 
The first two terms represent the direct effects, which equal 1 2 0P P  
 + = − = 
. Moreover, we know that firm 1 and 2’s quantity choices in the real-time market 
satisfy their first-order conditions, so that 1 2
* *
1 2
0
q q
  = =   (the envelope theorem). 
Therefore, we obtain that pairwise efficiency requires 
(3) ( ) ( )* *2 11 2
* *
2 1
0
dq dq
q d q d
  
 
 + =  . 
Firms’ bilateral profits ( ) ( )1 2   +  are not necessarily concave with respect to 
 .14 Equation (3) thus represents a necessary condition for pairwise efficiency, but 
does not serve as a sufficient condition. Nevertheless, the following result, proven 
in the appendix, is a powerful one that generally holds. 
Result 2: Under pairwise efficient forward trade, the real-time market is never a 
bilateral oligopoly. 
The intuition is as follows. Suppose it would be a bilateral oligopoly. Then, there 
must exist a pair of firms that consists of a net buyer in the real-time market and a 
net seller in the real-time market. Without loss of generality, denote the net buyer 
in the real-time market by firm 1 and denote the net seller in the real-time market 
by firm 2. 
Firms can then always gain from letting firm 1 purchase from firm 2 in the forward 
market. By doing so, firm 2’s net surplus in the real-time market shrinks, so that it 
has fewer incentives to exercise seller power in the real-time market. This effect 
benefits firm 1, who is a net buyer in the real-time market, and is formally 
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 See Van Moer (2019). 
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represented by the first term of equation (3). Also, the forward contract reduces 
firm 1’s volume purchased in the real-time market, which reduces its incentives to 
exercise buyer power. This effect benefits firm 2, who is a net seller in the real-time 
market, and is formally represented by the second term of equation (3). So, the 
forward contract reduces the competitive externalities that firms inflict upon each 
other, which is mutually beneficial. For this reason, firms always have incentives 
to sign forward contracts to rule out a bilateral oligopoly real-time market. 
2. Vertically-related pair 
We next consider pairwise trade between firm 1 and firm 3. We apply the same 
techniques: we denote firms’ candidate net forward contract positions by an 
asterisk, and we suppose without loss of generality that firm 1  purchases   units 
from firm 3, so that *1 1q q = +  and *3 3q q = − . As before, since contracts are 
private, the real-time market behavior of outsiders to the contract is independent of 
 . We can thus write that ( )* *  for 1,3j jq q j =  . 
Firms’ variable profits equal 
(4) ( )( )*1 1 1 1 1t PQ C q = + −   
(5) 3 3 3t PQ = + , 
where 
 
( ) ( )
( )
*
1 1
1
* *
1 1 1 1
*
3 3 3.
j j
j N
j
P a b q q q q
Q q q q
Q q q

 



  = − + + +   
= + + +
= − +

 
The pair of firms maximizes the gains from bilateral trade with respect to  . In 
other words, firms should not be able to increase bilateral profits (4) + (5) by 
altering  . We obtain the necessary first-order condition 
18 
 
( ) ( )* *1 13 31 1
* *
1 1
00
0
dq dq
q d q d
   
   
==
  + + + =    . 
As before, the first two terms represent the direct effects, which sum up to zero. 
The third term is zero because of the envelope theorem. Consequently, additional 
forward trade affects bilateral profits only through firm 1’s quantity choice. We 
work out and obtain 
(6)  ( ) ( )*1*3 3 0dqb q q d   − − + =  . 
We are now ready to state result 3. 
Result 3: Under pairwise efficient forward trade, the strategic non-dispatchable 
firms have a net surplus of zero in the real-time market. 
The proof is in the appendix. If result 3 would not hold, firm 1 would pose an 
externality on firm 3 because its quantity decision affects the price that firm 3  
receives or pays in the real-time market. Under pairwise efficiency, firms sign the 
forward contract that eliminates this externality by closing firm 3’s position. 
3. Pair of non-dispatchable firms 
Finally, for completeness, consider pairwise trade between two strategic non-
dispatchable firms 3 and 4. As before, we investigate firms’ incentives to trade   
additional units in the forward market, so that *3 3q q = +  and *4 4q q = − . Firms’ 
bilateral profits equal 
 ( ) ( )
3 4
* * *
3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4j j
j N
Q Q
P
t t a b q q q q q q   
 +
 + = + + − + + + + − +   , 
and are unaffected by  . 
We can now combine Result 2 and Result 3. From result 2, we know that strategic 
dispatchable firms have incentives to trade with each in the forward market rather 
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than in the real-time market, in order to avoid inefficiencies from bilateral 
oligopoly. Result 3 states that strategic non-dispatchable firms close their position 
entirely in the forward market. Consequently, the counterparties of strategic firms 
in the real-time market cannot be strategic firms themselves. This insight is stated 
in Result 4. 
Result 4: All net buyers or all net sellers in the real-time market have either 
foregone profitable pairwise forward trading opportunities or have behaved sub-
optimally in the real-time market. 
When firms act strategically, pairwise efficient forward trading crowds out trading 
in the real-time market. Consequently, observing that firms take large net positions 
in the real-time market indicates frictions. These frictions can for example originate 
from firms failing to trade pairwise efficiently due to uncertainties or asymmetric 
information. Alternatively, they can relate to firms having limited strategic 
capacities, a feature that has been documented in electricity markets by Hortacsu 
and Puller (2008) and Hortacsu et al. (2019). 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Real-time markets in practice 
In this subsection, I describe how real-time markets work in practice and motivate 
the model of Cournot competition. 
The organizations responsible for the balance between electricity injections and 
offtakes on the high-voltage grid are called system operators. When the system risks 
being long, maintaining a balanced grid requires a production-decrease or a 
consumption-increase. When the system risks being short, maintaining a balanced 
grid requires a production-increase or a consumption-decrease. In most countries, 
due to unbundling, system operators are not allowed to own or operate physical 
production or consumption assets. They therefore procure energy by means of 
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auctions. The bids offered by firms are stacked from cheap to expensive in a so-
called merit order. As more energy is required to balance the system, the bid that is 
activated on the margin is a more expensive one. System operators recover the costs 
of activating these bids by holding market participants responsible for the surplus 
or shortage they contribute to the system. In most countries, there is a uniform price 
that firms receive for each MWh of surplus or pay for each MWh of shortage they 
incur, although variations of this mechanism exist in some countries. The uniform 
price is typically determined by the system operator’s cost of activating the 
marginal bid. 
1. Auction-based balancing 
In markets with auction-based balancing, the decisions to activate and deactivate 
dispatchable assets are all determined by centralized auctions.15 The relevant 
framework to analyze competition under this regime is supply function competition 
(Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). In the absence of uncertainty, models of supply 
function competition are known to be characterized by multiple equilibria. The 
Cournot outcome analyzed in this paper represents one of them and is the one most 
preferred by firms. The feature of the Cournot model that dispatchable firms who 
are net sellers “underproduce” as compared to the social optimum corresponds to 
them bidding “positive markups” in the auction. Likewise, “underconsumption” by 
net buying firms corresponds to them bidding “negative markups” in the auction. 
2. Decentralized balancing 
Under decentralized balancing, firms can decentrally activate or deactivate the 
dispatchable assets they did not commit in the auction.16 The bids submitted in the 
auction then serve to resolve the residual need for balancing. Under this regime, the 
                                                 
15
 Examples of markets with auction-based balancing include the centralized dispatch systems in the 
U.S. and e.g. Spain in Europe. 
16
 Several European countries, such e.g. as Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, are 
characterized by decentral balancing. 
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Cournot model has a natural interpretation by capturing firms’ choices how much 
to produce decentrally.17 
Possible frictions that can hinder pairwise efficiency 
In this subsection, I discuss two possible sources of frictions that determine how 
well pairwise efficient forward trade holds in practice. 
A first source of possible frictions is uncertainty. Whether uncertainty hinders 
pairwise efficiency depends on whether the uncertainty reveals before or after the 
intraday gate closure time. In case the information updates arrive before the 
intraday gate closure time, firms still have opportunities to respond to them and 
alter their forward contract positions pairwise-efficiently. In contrast, in case the 
information updates arrive after the intraday gate closure time, firms can no longer 
alter their forward contract positions. Consequently, markets with a later intraday 
gate closure time are likely to be better characterized by pairwise efficient forward 
trading than markets with an earlier intraday gate closure time. For example, it is 
conceivable that most uncertainties have revealed by an intraday gate closure time 
at five minutes before real-time. However, an earlier intraday gate closure time 
would leave more uncertainties unresolved. 
A second source of possible frictions that can interact with pairwise efficiency is 
asymmetric information. A deep analysis on this subject would need to account for 
the market microstructure and is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it is 
useful to point out several factors that can be expected to reduce information 
asymmetries. First, asymmetric information regarding renewable energy generation 
would be reduced by publicly available weather forecasts. Second, many countries 
have regulations that require firms to report plant outages, thereby reducing 
asymmetric information regarding such events. Finally, intraday market prices 
serve as a public signal for abundance or scarcity. Therefore, intraday markets, 
                                                 
17
 Firms can prefer balancing decentrally over participating in the auction because, by doing so, they 
keep their rivals’ residual demand functions as price-inelastic as possible. This induces their rivals 
to compete less aggressively (see Singh and Vives, 1984). 
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particularly when liquid, contribute to diffusing information across market 
participants quickly. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the implications of pairwise efficient forward 
contracting in wholesale electricity markets. The analysis has distinguished 
different types of pairs. A horizontally-related pair consists of two firms with access 
to flexibility in the spot market, and a vertically-related pair consists of one firm 
with flexibility and another firm without flexibility in the spot market. 
The analysis of horizontal relations has shown a new efficiency rationale for 
forward trade: firms have incentives to trade forward to avoid a so-called bilateral 
oligopoly spot market, where firms incur net positions of the opposite sign. Net 
buyers and net sellers, by exercising market power, impose negative externalities 
on each other. Forward trading to remove these externalities is always in firms’ 
joint interest and is pro-competitive by reducing markups. 
This strategic motive for forward trading is distinct from the strategic commitment 
mechanism emphasized in previous studies, which requires all contracts to be 
observable. It is also distinct from forward trading to hedge risk, the rationale 
traditionally emphasized in the field of finance. The analysis has found that forward 
trading to avoid bilateral oligopoly reduces firms’ volumes exposed to the spot 
market price. Consequently, when firms trade for the strategic motive presented in 
this paper, they may also mitigate their exposure to possible price risk. Both 
forward trading motives can thus complement each other. 
The result also sheds new light on how to design short-term electricity markets. In 
particular, it points out a new channel through which late intraday market gate 
closure times can improve efficiency in markets with renewables: when firms face 
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idiosyncratic shocks to their portfolios, a late trading opportunity reduces the risk 
of a bilateral oligopoly real-time market. 
The analysis of vertical relations has indicated that firms who have access to 
flexibility, when deciding about how competitively to act, exert externalities on the 
firms without flexibility. Pairwise efficient forward contracting entirely removes 
these externalities by closing the positions of the firms without flexibility. This 
insight predicts that virtual bidders, who do not have access to physical generation 
or consumption assets, do not cause real-time imbalances between electricity 
injections and offtakes. 
Both results combined imply that, if pairwise forward trade is frictionless, strategic 
market participants have a strict preference for trading in the forward market rather 
than in the spot market. Consequently, non-zero net positions in the spot market 
indicate that some firms have either foregone profitable pairwise forward trading 
opportunities, did not behave profit-maximizingly in the spot market, or both. This 
outcome could be explained by frictions related to uncertainty, asymmetric 
information, or by firms having limited strategic abilities. 
Finally, the results of this paper also offer advice to new market participants who 
are designing their short-term electricity market trading strategies: it is not profit-
maximizing to sell in the real-time market when competitors are short (and the price 
is high) and to buy when competitors are long (and the price is low). Instead, firms 
should search for bilateral forward trading opportunities to avoid net positions of 
the opposite sign in the real-time market. Moreover, for renewable energy 
generators who lack flexibility, pairwise trading to minimize imbalances in the real-
time market is always a solid business strategy, even absent risk management 
considerations. 
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7. Appendix 
 
Proof of result 1. 
We construct an example that proves result 1. 
The example 
There are two strategic dispatchable firms, firm 1 and firm 2. The non-dispatchable 
firms, for simplicity, have a zero net surplus in the real-time market. The fringe’s 
net surplus in the real-time market equals 
 f f f f f
a PQ q q q q
b b
= + + = − + . 
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Consequently, the fringe is a (weak) net buyer if fP a b q −   and a net seller if 
fP a b q −  . 
We construct the example so that firm 1 enjoys a positive shock to its non-
dispatchable portfolio and firm 2 suffers from a negative shock to its non-
dispatchable portfolio. We will argue that as a result of these shocks, firm 1 acts as 
a net seller and firm 2 acts as a net buyer: the real-time market is a bilateral 
oligopoly. 
More specifically, suppose that firm 1 enjoys a positive shock to its non-
dispatchable portfolio such that the marginal cost at which it would produce the 
amount needed to be balanced ( 1 1 1q q q= − − ) satisfies 
( )'1 1 1 fC q q a b q− −  −  . 
Firm 2 suffers from a negative shock to its non-dispatchable portfolio such that the 
marginal cost at which it produces the amount needed to be balanced ( 2 2 2q q q= − −
) satisfies 
( )'2 2 2 fC q q a b q− −  −  . 
Analysis 
Without loss of generality, we can state that the market-clearing price satisfies one 
of two possibilities: fP a b q −   or fP a b q −  . In both scenarios we will show 
that the market is a bilateral oligopoly. 
1. fP a b q −  . 
Since fP a b q −  , the fringe is a (weak) net buyer in the real-time market. 
We prove that firm 2 is a (strict) net buyer in the real-time market by contradiction. 
Suppose that firm 2 would not be a (strict) net buyer: *2 2 2 0q q q+ +  . Then, we 
would have ( ) ( )' * '2 2 2 2 2 fC q C q q a b q − −  −  . We plug in this inequality in firm 
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2’s first-order condition and obtain ( )*2 2 2 fP b q q q a b q−  + +  −  . Since 
fP a b q −  , we get ( )*2 2 2 0b q q q−  + +  , which contradicts *2 2 2 0q q q+ +  . 
Therefore, the fringe and firm 2 buy a jointly positive net volume in the real-time 
market. Consequently, the balanced electricity system equation requires that firm 1 
is a net seller in the real-time market. This shows that the real-time market is a 
bilateral oligopoly. 
2. fP a b q −  . 
Since fP a b q −  , the fringe is a net seller in the real-time market. 
We prove that firm 1 is a (strict) net seller in the real-time market by contradiction. 
Suppose that firm 1 would not be a (strict) net seller: *1 1 1 0q q q+ +  . Then, we 
would have ( ) ( )' *1 1 1 1' fC q C q q a b q − −  −  . We can plug in this inequality in 
firm 1’s first-order condition and obtain ( )*1 1 1 fP b q q q a b q−  + +  −  . Since 
fP a b q −  , we get ( )*1 1 1 0b q q q−  + +  , which contradicts *1 1 1 0q q q+ +  . 
Therefore, the fringe and firm 1 sell a jointly positive net volume in the real-time 
market. Consequently, the balanced electricity system equation requires that firm 2 
is a net buyer in the real-time market. This shows that the real-time market is a 
bilateral oligopoly. 
Proof of result 2. 
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a bilateral oligopoly. Then, there 
must exist a pair of firms that consists of a net buyer in the real-time market and a 
net seller in the real-time market. Without loss of generality, we denote the net 
buyer in the real-time market by firm 1 and denote the net seller in the real-time 
market by firm 2. Formally, we can write that ( )* *1 1 1 0q q q + + +   and that 
( )* *2 2 2 0q q q − + +  . 
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The contradiction is proven in two steps. Step 1, presented below, shows that, the 
direct effects in equation (3) have the following signs 
(A1) ( ) ( )* *2 11 2
* *
2 1
0 0
dq dq
q d q d
  
 
 
 +  . 
Step 2, presented below, proves that ( )*1 0dq
d

   and 
( )*2 0dq
d

  . Expression (A1) 
is thus strictly positive, which contradicts that equation (3) holds. 
Step 1. 
We can use (1) to write 
 ( )( )* *1 1 1 1*
2
b q q q
q
   = − + + + . 
Since ( )* *1 1 1 0q q q + + +  , we know that 1*
2
0
q
  . 
Also, we can use (2) to write 
 ( )( )* *2 2 2 2*
1
b q q q
q
   = − − + + . 
Since ( )* *2 2 2 0q q q − + +  , we know that 2*
1
0
q
  . 
Step 2. 
Firm 1’s first-order condition in the real-time market equals 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
* * *
1 1 2 2
1,2
* * ' *
1 1 1 1 1 0.
j j
j N
j
a b q q q q q q
b q q q C q
 
  


    − + + + + +      
− + + + − =

 
Totally differentiating with respect to   gives 
31 
 
(A2) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )* *1 2'' *1 12 0dq dqb b C q bd d  − + − − + − = . 
This shows that ( )*1dq
d

  and 
( )*2dq
d

  are not simultaneously zero. 
Firm 2’s first-order condition in the real-time market equals 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
* * *
1 1 2 2
1,2
* * ' *
2 2 2 2 2 0.
j j
j N
j
a b q q q q q q
b q q q C q
 
  


    − + + + + +      
− − + + − =

 
Totally differentiating with respect to   gives 
(A3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )* *1 2 '' *2 22 0dq dqb b b C qd d   + − + − − = . 
Adding up (A2) and (A3), we obtain that 
(A4) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )* *1 2'' * '' *1 1 2 2
0 0
3 3 0
dq dq
b C q b C q
d d
   
 
− − + − − = . 
Since marginal costs are increasing, we can sign the second and fourth term in 
equation (A4). 
Moreover, since we know that ( )*1dq
d

  and 
( )*2dq
d

  are not simultaneously zero, 
from (A4), each of these derivatives must be non-zero. As a result, from (A4), it 
must be true that ( )*1dq
d

  and 
( )*2dq
d

  have an opposite sign. 
Finally, we show that ( )*1 0dq
d

   and 
( )*2 0dq
d

   by contradiction. Suppose not. 
Then, ( )*1 0dq
d

   and 
( )*2 0dq
d

  . Writing (A2) – (A3) then gives 
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( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )* *1 2'' * '' *1 1 2 2
0 0
2 0
dq dq
b b C q b C q
d d
   
 
− + − − + + = , 
a contradiction. 
Proof of result 3. 
Step one establishes that ( )*1 0dq
d

  . Step two establishes that 
*
3 3q q = + . 
Step one. 
We start from firm 1’s first-order condition in the real-time market, which equals 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* * * ' *1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
0j j
j N
j
P
a b q q q q b q q q C q   


    − + + + − + + + − =      
 . 
Totally differentiating with respect to   gives 
 
( ) ( )( )( )*1 '' *1 12 0dqb b C qd  − + − − = , 
rewritten as 
 
( )
( )
*
1
'' *
1 1
0
2
dq b
d b C q

 = − − . 
Step two. 
The necessary condition for pairwise efficiency (6) is satisfied if and only if 
 ( )*3 3 0b q q− − + = , 
equivalently written as 
 
*
3 3q q = + . 
